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THE IDEA OF NATURAL RIGHTS-ORIGINS AND PERSISTENCE1
Brian Tierney∗
As we stand at the opening of a new century, the present status of human rights is, as usual,
somewhat precarious and their future in the world unpredictable.2 There are not only very obvious
problems of practical implementation in many parts of the world, but also serious doubts as to whether a
Western ideal of human rights can have any universal significance for all peoples. Samuel Huntington, in his
Clash of Civilizations, presents our modern culture of rights as a Western peculiarity with no resonance
for the rest of humanity.3 Another modern study has the unpromising title, Human Rights: a Western
Construct with Limited Applicability.4 At the other extreme a UNESCO report of 1947, referring to the
idea of human rights, observed that "its beginnings in the West as well as in the East coincide with the
beginnings of philosophy."5 In the same spirit, Nikolas Gvosdev has discussed the policy of religious
toleration pursued by some Chinese and Mongol emperors, including Genghis Khan, as an anticipation of
the modern practice of human rights.6 But it is a mistake to see a concern for rights whenever we
encounter policies that we may find morally congenial but that were really based on quite other grounds.
Genghis Khan was not really an early champion of human rights. Our modern concept has not always
existed everywhere; rather it has its own distinctive history that we shall try to explore, and in its early
stages it was indeed a Western history.
¶ 1

¶ 2 Before turning to this early history there is one more aspect of the contemporary situation that I

need to mention. Even in the Western world, the original homeland of natural rights thinking, there is no
consensus—and sometimes overt skepticism—about the existence and grounding of such rights.
Libertarians and communitarians contend fiercely about the merits of their respective positions. Statesmen
seem obliged to pay lip service at least to the idea of human rights, but philosophers often take a more
skeptical stance. Alasdair MacIntyre, for instance, has declared that "there are no such rights and belief in
them is one with belief in witches and in unicorns."7 He prefers an earlier way of thinking that emphasized
∗
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the pursuit of virtue rather than the assertion of rights. Another writer complains that the modern emphasis
on rights has led to a lack of concern for the common good and to a society marked by "corrosive
selfishness."8
But the most widespread modern objection to natural rights thinking is derived from cultural
relativism or historicism. There are and have been hundreds of human societies. They all have different
customs, different values; so, on this argument, there cannot be one set of human rights valid for all of
them. Richard Rorty, for instance, has argued that "history goes all the way down," that peoples are
irremediably molded in different ways by their different cultures. An historical approach cannot solve all
these problems of modern philosophers and social scientists, but it might lead us to address them from a
different and perhaps more helpful perspective.
¶ 3

In presenting the origins and early history—a sort of “Ur-history”—of the idea of natural rights,
I shall necessarily be describing a Western construct. It is important, therefore, to emphasize at the outset
that we shall not be dealing with an inevitable unfolding of ideas always present in the Western psyche or
with a sort of predetermined organic growth from Western cultural genes.9 Western history offered other
alternatives. Plato discussed an ideal society without any appeal to natural rights. Moses gave
commandments to the children of Israel, not a code of rights. The Christian church has suppressed rights in
some contexts as well as affirming them in others. There was nothing inevitable about the emergence of a
doctrine of natural rights. To explain how the idea first arose, we need to consider a series of contingent
situations that occurred in the course of Western history and try to understand how the various responses
to them shaped this new way of thinking.
¶4

¶ 5 In pursuing this theme, I came to think that the jurists of the twelfth century, especially the
church lawyers, played an important innovatory role. The problem, we shall see, is partly one of juristic
semantics, to understand how the little phrase ius naturale shifted from an objective to a subjective
meaning, how an ancient concept of natural law was reshaped into a modern idea of natural rights. I want
to carry the story of origins from the twelfth century down to around 1500 because then an unforeseen
event—a new contingency—redirected the course of human rights thinking for the future. I have in mind
the European encounter with America and the great debate that it stirred up about the rights of American
Indians among Spanish scholars, especially Vitoria and Las Casas and, on the other side, Sepulveda. At
that time an ideal of human rights was passionately asserted and vigorously contested. And so it has been
through the centuries. Our history can perhaps illustrate both the vitality and the vulnerability of the ideal.

At present, however, there is no agreement among historians about our problem of early
origins. Some favor Hobbes as originator, some Grotius, some Gerson. But probably the most widely
accepted viewpoint nowadays finds the first formulation of a concept of subjective natural rights in the
nominalist philosophy of the late Middle Ages. This argument has been presented most fully in the many
books and articles of the French scholar, Michel Villey. Villey contrasted the modern idea of subjective
¶ 6

8
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natural rights with an older tradition of objective natural right. He pointed out that the Latin phrase ius
naturale traditionally meant "what is naturally just" or natural law. But a subjective natural right was
something quite different. According to Villey, a subjective right was "a faculty, an ability, a liberty to act"
or, specifically, "a power of the individual." But ius understood as law or objective right was a restraint on
power. The two concepts were antithetical, radically incompatible with one another, and Villey much
preferred the earlier one. Villey was disdainful of all the modern multiplying claims to rights. He wrote that,
in a culture of rights, justice becomes "merely a label that we put on our own subjective preferences."10
For Villey, the great innovator, the revolutionary who first created a doctrine of subjective
rights, was the fourteenth-century Franciscan philosopher, William of Ockham. On this view, Ockham's
nominalist philosophy, holding that only individual entities had real existence, naturally led on to an
individualistic political theory. So Villey wrote that Ockham was the father of subjective rights and,
avoiding all sexist bias in the modern fashion, he also wrote that Ockham's philosophy was the mother of
subjective rights. Specifically, Villey held, Ockham instituted a "semantic revolution" when he associated
for the first time the two concepts, ius and potestas, right and power. Villey regarded this as an
unfortunate aberration.
¶ 7

An argument rather similar to Villey's was presented in America by Leo Strauss and the group
of scholars whom he influenced. In this version, Hobbes takes the place of Ockham as the revolutionary
innovator, but Strauss too emphasized a radical opposition between an older doctrine of natural right or
natural law that imposed obligation on us, and the modern concept of natural rights that focuses on the
self-assertion of the individual.11 Hobbes did indeed sharply distinguish the two concepts. In the Leviathan
he wrote, "Law, and Right, differ as much, as Obligation, and Liberty; which in one and the same matter
are inconsistent."12 Yet many late medieval and modern thinkers have considered the concepts of natural
law and natural rights as mutually supportive of one another. This leaves us with a problem to which I will
return after considering some medieval sources.
¶8

¶ 9 It was in reading Villey that I began to think of twelfth-century jurisprudence as a significant
source of later natural rights language. Villey held that Ockham made a radical innovation and produced a
"hybrid monster" when he defined ius (right) as a subjective power (potestas). But in fact such language
was common in juridical writings—especially among the medieval canonists—for more than a century
before Ockham. One canonist, writing on the role of bishops-elect just before 1200, declared simply,
"They have a power of administering, that is a right" (potestas . . . id es ius). Moreover, the twelfth
century provides us with an unusual historical context within which the emergence of an idea of subjective
natural rights becomes intelligible. The idea arose, I would argue from the conjunction of a new age of
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cultural vitality with a new hermeneutics, a new preoccupation with the old texts of the Western juridical
tradition.
The twelfth century was an age of renaissance, of new vitality in many spheres of life and
thought. This was the age of the first great gothic cathedrals and the first universities. New networks of
commerce grew up and with them a revival of city life. In religious life there was a new emphasis on the
individual human person—on individual intention in assessing guilt, individual consent in marriage, individual
scrutiny of conscience. And in the everyday life of the time there was an intense concern for rights and
liberties. Kings asserted their rights against over-ambitious popes, and bishops—most famously Thomas
Becket—defended the rights of the church against powerful kings. Feudal society was a structure of
interlocking rights—the rights of lords and vassals in relation to one another. And within feudal society
many new communal associations were growing up that claimed specific rights and liberties for their
members—city communes and innumerable guilds of merchants and craftsmen. This widespread concern
for rights is famously exemplified in the Anglo-American tradition by our cherished Magna Carta. The first
clause of Magna Carta declared that, "the English Church shall be free, and shall have all its rights entire."13
Then the document went on to specify various rights of feudal lords and vassals and of merchants and
sometimes of all free Englishmen. The concern for rights, however, was not a peculiarly English
phenomenon. There were similar charters in other countries, and in the same year that Magna Carta was
issued in England, an influential canonist in Bologna was writing, "No one is to be deprived of his right
except for a very grave offense."14
¶ 10

For the purpose of our inquiry the most important feature of the twelfth-century renaissance
was a great revival of legal studies, centered at first in Italy at Bologna. This was a new civilization,
emerging after centuries of near-anarchy. Medieval people valued their rights but, in a still turbulent age,
they also felt a need for more adequate systems of law. First, around 1100, came a recovery of the whole
corpus of Roman law, then an immensely influential codification of church law in the work known as
Gratian's Decretum (c. 1140). Canon law will not seem a very exciting study to most modern readers, but
the twelfth-century canonists were not merely expounding a fixed body of ecclesiastical norms. They were
engaged in a great enterprise, the creation of a new structure of universal jurisprudence for the church
where none had existed before. Gratian's Decretum was not just a compendium of twelfth-century rules
and regulations. It reached back to the church Fathers and the early councils of the church; it presented the
juridical life of the church in the world for a thousand years, all included in one volume and equipped with a
critical commentary. Medieval intellectuals found the work fascinating and they flocked to the great law
schools of Bologna to study it. Soon dozens, then hundreds, of commentaries on the Decretum were
written—nearly all of them still unpublished and accessible only in medieval manuscripts.
¶ 11

Of course, the rights I have mentioned so far—the kind of rights we find in Magna Carta—
were rights of particular persons and classes. We still have to consider how medieval canonists of all
¶ 12

13
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people became interested in natural rights.15 It came about like this. The very first chapters of the
Decretum presented texts that included several different usages of the term ius naturale, and sometimes
they seemed inconsistent with one another. For instance, Gratian himself wrote that by natural law all
property was common. Then he wrote that any human law contrary to natural law was vain and void. So
how could the existence of property in the real world, held according to human law, be explained and
justified? The early commentators quickly realized that the term ius naturale was being used with different
meanings in different contexts. The greatest of them, Huguccio (c. 1190), explained to his students: "Not
all the examples of ius naturale given below refer to the same meaning of ius naturale . . . But, lest the
mind of some idiot be confused, I will diligently explain them all." And he proceeded to do so—at length.
¶ 13 The important point for us is that, in explaining the various possible senses of

ius naturale, the
jurists found a new meaning that was not really present in their ancient texts. Reading the old texts with
minds formed in their new, more personalist, more rights-based culture, they added a new definition.
Sometimes they defined natural right in a subjective sense as a power, force, ability or faculty inhering in
human persons. These usages did not at first define a doctrine of specific rights. When the canonists wrote
of ius naturale as a faculty or power they meant primarily an ability rooted in human reason and free will
to discern what was right and to act rightly. But once the old concept of natural right was defined in this
subjective way the argument could easily lead to the rightful rules of conduct prescribed by natural law or
to the licit claims and powers inhering in individuals that we call natural rights. Soon the canonists did begin
to argue in this way and to specify some such rights. The first one, a very radical one, was a right of the
destitute poor to the necessities of life, even if this meant appropriating for themselves the surplus property
of the rich.16
In presenting subjective definitions of ius naturale, the canonists did not abandon the old
meaning of the term as natural justice; rather they were coming to see that an adequate concept of natural
justice had to include a concept of individual rights. Nor were the canonists asserting a doctrine of mere
selfish individualism. After all, the first words of the Decretum, their great law book, were a restatement of
the Golden Rule, "Do unto others as you would have them do unto you." Also, the canonists did not
contrast individual values with community values. They could have agreed with a modern philosopher,
Jacques Maritain, when he wrote that "there is nothing more illusory than to pose the problem of the
person and the common good in terms of opposition."17 Maritain, who saw a relationship of "mutual
implication" between individual and community, based his argument on a complex metaphysical theory.18
The canonists were not metaphysicians but jurists; and so, without any overt philosophizing, they thought
long and hard about the many forms of corporate life that were growing up in their society and created a
¶ 14

15
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subtle and intricate juridical theory of corporation structure that allowed for a play of individual rights
within corporate bodies.19
Two more important developments of juristic thought occurred in the course of the thirteenth
century. Toward the end of the century jurists began to argue that the right to appear and defend oneself
before a court of law—what we should call a right to due process—was not just a part of the civil law of
particular nations but rather was grounded in the universal natural law. They argued that, just as there was
a natural right of self-defense against physical assault, so too there should be a right to defend oneself
against legal charges.20
¶ 15

¶ 16 The second thirteenth-century development concerned a perennial problem in discussions of
natural rights that we have already mentioned. Are claims to natural rights peculiar to Western culture or
do such rights belong or should belong to all peoples? In the middle of the thirteenth century, Pope
Innocent IV, a great canonist in his own right, faced a similar issue. He asked whether the basic rights to
own property and to create licit governments belonged only to Christian peoples or whether even
infidels—he had in mind particularly Muslims—could also enjoy these rights. The most extreme papalists
of the time held that, since the pope was the representative of God on earth, he was lord of the whole
world and, hence, rightful ownership and legitimate jurisdiction could inhere only in those who recognized
his authority. Innocent himself was a strong defender of papal power but he would not go so far. Instead,
he wrote "God makes his sun to rise on the good and the wicked and he feeds the birds of the air."21
Accordingly, the pope declared, "ownership, possession and jurisdiction can belong to infidels licitly . . .
for these things were made not only for the faithful but for every rational creature."22 Innocent's text had a
significant afterlife. It was often repeated in canonistic commentaries and was eventually adopted by
sixteenth-century theologians who defended the rights of American Indians against their Spanish
conquerors.
¶ 17 Before leaving the medieval canonists we need to consider one more very important aspect of

their thought. In discussing the views of Villey and Strauss, I mentioned a problem inherent in their
arguments about natural law and natural rights. If jus naturale in its classical sense was a restraint on
power, as Villey argued, it could not (without a semantic revolution) also define the subjective right or
power inhering in individuals that we encounter in Ockham. In his more pungent language, Hobbes made
the same point: "Law is a fetter; Right is freedome, and they differ like contraries."23 Obviously one cannot
derive a freedom from a fetter.24 The two concepts seem to be, as Hobbes wrote, "irreconcilable." And
19
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yet many medieval and modern thinkers have treated the doctrine of rights as a legitimate development of
principles always inherent in the natural law tradition.
The explanation lies in another aspect of the canonists' teaching on ius naturale. Adapting a
Roman law doctrine that law could be permissive as well as perceptive, they sometimes argued that natural
law too did not consist only of restraints on power, commands and prohibitions; it could also define an
area of permissiveness where agents were free to act as they chose. According to one of their definitions,
ius naturale could mean "What is permitted and approved though not commanded or prohibited by any
law." Huguccio used this concept of permissive natural law to justify the existence of private property.
Common ownership was indeed included in ius naturale, as several text of the Decretum asserted but,
Huguccio argued, only as permission, not as a command of natural law. In this area, humans were free to
make other arrangements including the establishment of rights to private property. The canonists were, so
to speak, hollowing out a sphere of individual freedom where rights could be exercised within the
framework of the old ius naturale. 25
¶ 18

There is a whole history still to be written about the idea of permissive natural law as a ground
of natural rights. The idea persisted for several centuries from the twelfth century onward in the writings of
such figures as Vitoria, Suarez, and Grotius. Locke, in his turn, referred to "the permissions of the law of
nature." Eighteenth-century jurists continued the discussion. Christian Wolff wrote, "the law of nature is
called preceptive when it commands us to act; it is called prohibitive when it forbids us to act; it is called
permissive when it gives us a right to act."26 Huguccio could have understood that very well. Even
Immanuel Kant appealed to permissive natural law in explaining the origin of individual property.
¶ 19

¶ 20 To return finally to the canonists. It would be incorrect to maintain that their scattered glosses
presented any coherent theory of natural rights; the achievement of the Decretists was something different;
they were creating a language within which a doctrine of rights could be expressed by generations of later
thinkers. Their definitions of ius as "faculty" or "power" were repeated frequently by jurists and political
theorists down to the time of Grotius. And already by 1300 some natural rights were coming to be
recognized—the right of the destitute poor that I mentioned, a right of self-defense against physical assault
or in a court of law, rights in marriage, even rights of infidels. But this was only a beginning. There was no
certainty that the doctrine would persist and become explicit in Western political theory. As it happened,
though, new situations arose within which the rights language of the lawyers was preserved and developed.

The next such context, the next contingency, was a great dispute that arose early in the
fourteenth century between the pope and the leaders of the Franciscan Order about Franciscan poverty
and property. The dispute arose out of the Franciscans' claim that they had abandoned all property "singly
and in common" and all right to use property, retaining for themselves only a "bare factual use" of things.
The Franciscans further claimed that by living in this fashion they were faithfully imitating the perfect
evangelical way of life instituted by Christ and the first apostles. For reasons that are still not clear, Pope
¶ 21

25
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John XXII decided to condemn this doctrine. Perhaps the pope saw that, if the Franciscan claim were
true, then the church never had exemplified an evangelical way of life, for it had always owned property.
Whatever his motives, in 1323 the pope decreed that henceforth it would he considered heretical to
maintain that Christ and the apostles had nothing or that they had no rights in the things that they actually
used. In another decree directed against the Franciscans, the pope made the point that there could be no
just use of anything without a right of using it. The pope's language ensured that the idea of a right would
be at the center of the ensuing debate.
It was this dispute that inspired all the political writings of William of Ockham. In 1328, he
joined a group of dissident Franciscans who refused to accept the pope's decrees, and subsequently
poured out a flood of works defending the Franciscan position and attacking the pope. These works did
make important contributions to the developing idea of natural rights as Villey insisted; but in them
Ockham was not embarking on a semantic revolution. He was carrying on an established tradition of
juristic discourse, sometimes in new and interesting ways. In his polemical writings Ockham did not refer
to his nominalist philosophy but he relied on frequent citations of earlier canonistic texts. Responding to the
pope's argument that there could be no just use without a right of using, Ockham took up the canonists'
argument about a natural right to the necessities of life. The right that the Franciscans had renounced, he
argued, was every kind of worldly right, every right to sue in court, or to own property. But there was also
a natural right to use external things that was common to all men and that was derived from nature, not
from any human statute; and no one could renounce this right since it was necessary to maintain life. By
virtue of this right, Ockham argued, the friars could use justly without having any right derived from human
law. "The friars do have a right," he wrote, "namely a natural right."27
¶ 22

Ockham first took up the idea of natural rights, I think, just as a debating ploy to respond to a
rather forceful argument of John XXII. But, once he had used the idea in this way in his first polemical
work, he apparently saw that it had much further potential. In his later works Ockham supplemented his
defense of Franciscan poverty with wide-ranging attacks on the whole doctrine of papal absolutism
asserted by the pope's supporters, and in doing so he succeeded in turning the old idea of Christian
freedom, found in scripture, into an argument for natural rights. According to scripture Christian law was "a
law of perfect liberty"; but if the pope possessed a truly absolute power, Ockham argued, the Christian
people would be reduced to a state of miserable servitude. To define the limits of papal power he
reminded the pope that all just governments existed for the common good, but he also referred repeatedly
to the individual natural rights of the subjects, "the rights and liberties conceded by God and nature."28 It
was perhaps the first time that the idea of natural rights had been used to challenge the claims of absolutist
government.
¶ 23

I will mention just one more medieval figure, the great French theologian, Jean Gerson who
wrote at the time of the conciliar movement for church reform around 1400. Gerson gave a very influential
definition of a right as "a faculty or power belonging to anyone according to right reason," and from this he
derived a natural right of self-defense against a tyrannical pope and a natural right of liberty through which
¶ 24

27
28

For a more detailed discussion of Ockham's argument with relevant texts see TIERNEY, supra note 1, at 118-130.
Id. at 182-193.
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a Christian could seek his own salvation even in a corrupt church. But Gerson also maintained an ideal of
the church as an ordered organic community, a mystical body in theological language. It did not occur to
him to oppose individual rights to community values. He cherished both.
So a tradition of natural rights was quite ancient and quite widely diffused in the years around
1500. But by then the tradition was becoming moribund. The debates about natural rights that were going
on in the schools of Paris at that time were full of metaphysical subtleties, but they had little to do with any
real-life problems. They seem like arguments for the sake of argument, clever intellectuals playing clever
intellectual games. For instance, in earlier natural rights theories and then again in those of the seventeenth
century it was often asked whether a right to property—dominion—came from natural law or civil law.
When John Mair, a leading master of Paris, addressed this question around 1500 he took a deep breath,
so to speak, and told his students that, to begin with, there were eight kinds of dominion to consider. They
were: Dominion of the blessed, dominion of the damned, original dominion, natural dominion, gratuitous
dominion, evangelical dominion, civil dominion, and canonical dominion.29 The students must have been
very impressed if not completely baffled. And John Mair was relatively simple for his time. His
contemporary, Conrad Summenhart, found no less than twenty-three different kinds of dominion, each
with associated rights. The argument goes on and on and as it moves through the endless distinctions and
subdistinctions it seems to become ever more remote from any problems of the real world.
¶ 25

¶ 26 This was just the kind of tired late medieval scholasticism that the Renaissance humanists were

trying to laugh out of existence. And they might have succeeded. Late scholastic thinkers like John Mair
were living in the world of Machiavelli and the "new monarchies," a time when there was more concern for
orderly government than for individual rights. Contemporary humanists looked for guidance to the ancient
world of Greece and Rome, and there they found arguments for monarchy, and for mixed government and
for classical republicanism, but nothing about natural rights. It is perfectly possible to make coherent
political theories without this concept and Renaissance writers often did so. There is no more talk of
natural rights in More's Utopia than in Plato's Republic. Perhaps the whole doctrine of natural rights—
reduced to a sort of late scholastic word-play, far removed from real life—might have been swept away in
the new world of Renaissance humanism.
But a new, unforeseen contingency changed all this—the European discovery of America.
Quite suddenly the abstract scholastic discourse became relevant to a great new world historical problem,
the possible justifications of colonialism, the rights of indigenous peoples. A great debate arose in Spain,
often centered again on the concept of natural rights. Could such rights be truly universal human rights? Or
were some people natural slaves as Aristotle had taught? Could rights inhere not only in civilized people
like Spaniards but also in idol-worshipers, cannibals, naked savages even?
¶ 27

¶ 28 I can consider only one participant in the debate here so I will choose the most passionate and

prolific of them, Bartolomée de las Casas, the great defender of the Indians.30 Las Casas wrote, in a
famous phrase, "All the races of humankind are one." And so, arguing from this conviction, he claimed
29
30

John Mair, Joannis Maioris . . . IN QUARTUM SENTENTIARUM QUAESTIONES, Dist.15 q.10 (Paris, 1519).
For the texts of Las Casas cited in the following discussion see TIERNEY, supra note 1, at 272-287.
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human rights for the Indians, a right to liberty, a right to own property, a right of self-defense, a right to
form their own governments. Las Casas eventually wrote a whole shelf of books in defense of the Indians,
but his underlying thought is expressed in just one line from one of them: "They are our brothers, and Christ
died for them." But, although Las Casas wrote out of this deep religious commitment, he also saw the need
to defend Indian rights in terms of reason and law that could have the widest appeal. Indeed, his work is
especially interesting in the present context because he appealed overtly and frequently to the juridical
tradition that undergirded the earlier development of natural rights theories. To give just one example, he
took up an old maxim of the medieval jurists—Quod omnes tangit ("What touches all is to be approved
by all")—and used it to prove that Spanish rule in America could be legitimate only if the Indians
consented to it, for the matter certainly "touched" them. The quirk in Las Casas' argument was that he
applied it to each individual Indian. Where the natural right to liberty was concerned, the consent of a
majority could not prejudice the rights of minority individuals withholding consent. The claim of the minority
dissenters should prevail. It was an extreme doctrine of individual natural rights. In another context,
weaving together a text of Gratian's Decretum with one from Thomas Aquinas, Las Casas wrote, "Liberty
is a right instilled in man from the beginning."
Las Casas also presented a detailed argument against Aristotle's doctrine of natural slavery, a
doctrine that was revived and defended by Sepulveda, a leading adversary of Las Casas in the Indies
debates. The Indians were clearly barbarians, Sepulveda argued, and he pointed out, Aristotle had taught
that all barbarians were natural slaves. Las Casas responded by distinguishing various senses of the word
barbarian. The word could refer to all cruel and merciless people, but in that sense the Spanish were more
barbarous than the Indians. People who could not understand each others' language could be called
barbarians to one another, but here the Spanish and the Indians were equally barbarians. Sometimes all
non-Christian people were classified as barbarians, but again the word did not imply natural slavery for it
referred to peoples of high culture like the ancient Greeks and Romans. Finally, Las Casas mentioned one
rare kind of human being who might correspond to Aristotle's natural slaves—wild, savage men who lived
alone in the forests and mountains like brute animals without any ordered society. Las Casas' argument
ended here with a striking conclusion. Even these people, even the most degraded class of humans, were
not entirely without rights, he maintained. Specifically they had a right to brotherly kindness and Christian
love. It was truly a doctrine of human rights that Las Casas presented.
¶ 29

The writings of the Spanish Neoscholastics gave new life to the idea of natural rights. In the
following centuries the idea continued to grow in mens’ minds and to flourish. New contingencies arose,
new contexts within which the idea was applied in new ways—the Wars of Religion in Europe, the English
Civil War, and then the American Revolution and the French Revolution. But after that apogee the
enthusiasm for natural rights again dwindled away. For Jeremy Bentham all talk of natural rights was
nonsense and "nonsense upon stilts." Under the onslaught of legal positivism, cultural relativism, and the
formidable challenge of Marxism, the idea of natural rights was abandoned by most jurists and
philosophers. But then, finally, in our own time, came the aftermath of World War II and a great revival of
the ideal of universal human rights. For a time at least simple-minded cultural relativism seemed inadequate
in face of the unthought-of evils of the Nazi regime.
¶ 30
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¶ 31 But then, as always in this history, new objections arose. Skeptical philosophers have
reminded us that there really is no universal human nature, no "essence" of humanity as Richard Rorty put
it, for human rights to inhere in. So we find ourselves in the confused situation that I mentioned at the
outset. Perhaps, though, our urhistory can help us a little here. A reading of the early sources will suggest
that the idea of natural rights never was necessarily dependant on some now outmoded metaphysical
theory of essences. For Huguccio or Ockham or Gerson—as for John Locke in a later age—it was
enough that humans have some common characteristics.31 Surely in all societies people have preferred life
to death, freedom to servitude, nutrition to starvation, dignity to humiliation. And human rights claims are
one way of addressing these common needs and aspirations of human beings.

We might also learn from our history to appreciate better the wide variety of contexts within
which a doctrine of rights could take root and flourish. Medieval society was Christian and Western but in
most ways it was more like the society of an underdeveloped country nowadays than like a modern
industrial state. We could learn too from medieval authors that individual values and community values do
not have to be in conflict with one another. They can exist in a state of synthesis, even of synergy.
Medieval people seem to have known intuitively that individuals flourish best in healthy societies. The first
right theories were not necessarily in conflict with the communitarian values of traditional societies.
¶ 32

¶ 33 A more widespread recognition and effective implementation of human rights in the future is
neither inevitable nor impossible. History throws contingencies at us; the outcome depends on how we
respond to them. It is true that the idea of human rights is of Western origin; but that does not mean that it
is necessarily irrelevant for everyone else. Huntington's picture of five self-contained civilizations seems
over-simplified in an age of globalization. Some modern cultural phenomena are universal. Modern
technology is a Western creation, the product of several centuries of distinctively Western development,
but it has been eagerly accepted in all parts of the world. A Malay fisherman prefers to put an outboard
engine on his boat rather than straining at an oar; he does not care that it comes to him from an alien
civilization. It is harder to spread ideas and ideals then to export artifacts; but in modern times, even on the
level of political thought and practice, the most ancient oriental civilizations have been molded in part by
external influences. China imported Marxism from the West; India and Japan derived their constitutional
structures from Britain and America. Moreover, all the great world religions have taught respect for the
value and dignity of human life, and this is the only necessary grounding for a doctrine of universal rights.
So it is possible that the ethical norms of various other cultures might be transposed into our Western
idiom of human rights and even that this might be of value to the human race. Perhaps we in the West tend
to exaggerate the range of rights that should be considered truly universal; certainly we cannot "put a label"
on all our Western preferences and call them universal rights. But if we continue to cherish a few core
rights that really do respond to the common needs of humanity we might still hope to ameliorate, to some
extent, the condition of humankind in the coming centuries.

31

Alison Renteln has pointed out that the evidence of anthropological relativism does not exclude the possibility that
they may be cross-cultural universals. A LISON RENTELN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: UNIVERSALISM VERSUS
RELATIVISM 98 (1990).
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